Introduction
[1] “As in water face reflects face, so the heart of man reflects the man.” (Proverbs 27:19) Water reflects faces and hearts reflect character. There is nothing new about these mirrors and what they reveal. Yet, there is a new mirror that offers us a haunting reflection of ourselves: we must now grapple with how artificial intelligence reflects humanity back unto itself.
[2] If society is alarmed by what it sees emerging within artificial intelligence (AI) technology, this alarm is simply the result of seeing ourselves reflected back unto ourselves through our technological inventions. If we do not like what we see in AI, we must realize that it is merely reflecting an image of ourselves back unto ourselves. Shannon Vallor, in her book The AI Mirror, writes, “AI isn’t developing in harmful ways today because it’s misaligned with our current values. It’s already expressing those values all too well…AI is a mirror of ourselves, not as we ought to be or could be but as we already are and have long been.”[1] In other words, AI is a human invention that learns and regurgitates what we ourselves have created.
[3] Seeing ourselves reflected in AI technologies, however, is not the whole picture. AI reflects not only human data and information, but also our ethical and philosophical assumptions. Just as we view our image in the mirror through the constructs of self-esteem and aesthetics, we must consider the undergirding assumptions that we have about technology and how this is essential to making sense of our views on AI. It is not enough to say that what we see in the AI-mirror is shocking or horrifying, exciting or inticing; we must also interrogate the reason why these reflections induce these sorts of responses within us.
[4] This article will explore the ethical and philosophical frameworks that surround our AI interactions. Whether conscious or preconscious, our philosophy of technology contributes to our views on AI and whether this technology elicits hope or fear, optimism or pessimism. This article argues that a theologically informed philosophy of technology enables an approach to AI that avoids the extremes of pessimism or optimism while retaining the helpful insights of both. Our ability to have a constructive view of AI depends on our ability to think theologically about this emerging technology.
Optimistic and Pessimistic Philosophies of Technology
[5] Philosophy of technology is a relatively recent subdiscipline within philosophy. While conversations about techne go as far back as Aristotle and classical philosophy, the development of a specific subdiscipline devoted to the topic of technology happened within the past century. Despite its relatively brief existence, philosophy of technology has already developed a vast array of disciplinary camps and traditions—phenomenologists and transcendentalists, instrumentalists and positivists, post-phenomenologists and neo-Heideggerians.[2] While these traditions diverge in several important ways, they can all be organized according to a polarity between optimism and pessimism. The following discussion about philosophy of technology will arrange these various traditions according to their either optimistic or pessimistic orientation toward technology.
[6] It is almost uniformly agreed that the modern discipline of philosophy of technology is indebted to Martin Heidegger’s 1955 lecture, “The Question Concerning Technology”; though not uniformly accepted or esteemed, Heidegger’s essay is of exceeding influence and nearly all subsequent philosophy of technology discourse has been aimed at agreeing, disagreeing, or in some way interacting with his views.[3]
[7] Heidegger is often described as presenting a view of technology that is not merely anti-technology, but decidedly pessimistic toward it.[4] The basis for Heidegger’s pessimism toward technology begins by questioning what technology is and what is the essence of technology.[5] A correct answer for what technology is could be that technology is ‘end-seeking’ and it involves tools or machines. In this sense, technology is instrumental in that it is used in order to accomplish something else. Heidegger argues that this may be a correct understanding of technology, but it is not true: “The correct always fixes upon something pertinent in whatever is under consideration. However, in order to be correct, this fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at the point where such an uncovering happens does the true come to pass.”[6] The truth of technology, therefore, is not found in the instrumental view of technology but rather in how technology is a way of revealing. Technology reveals according to its peculiar mode of ‘bringing forth.’ That is to say that Heidegger understands technology as bringing forth the world in a particular way.
[8] Within Heidegger’s schema, modern technology reveals the world in a different way than traditional technology. Traditional technology works by ‘bringing forth’ the power of wind or water as forces to be reckoned with, respected, revered, or appreciated.[7] Modern technologies, on the other hand, go beyond this bringing forth and instead function as a sort of ‘challenging forth’ of the natural world. Unlike a watermill bringing forth the power of water, a hydro-electric dam challenges forth water by stockpiling it so that it can become a ‘standing-reserve’ of energy. In the words of Nolan Gertz,
The reduction of nature from a godlike force to a controllable energy source is what Heidegger sees as the defining feature of modern technology, as what has led humanity to take ourselves to be a godlike force, to be the beings for whom not only technology but the natural world that technology mines, harvests, and stockpiles is seen as mere instrumentality, as mere means to our ends, as existing merely to satisfy our demands.[8]
[9] Modern technology, according to Heidegger, turns everything into standing reserve and it becomes a sort of technological a priori, conforming everything to a machine way of thinking.[9] The world then becomes ‘enframed’ (Gestell) in terms of manipulable ‘standing-reserve’ to be ordered and regulated. Heidegger offers an example of this when he compares a lumberjack and his grandfather walking through the same woods: “The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather is today commanded by profit-making in the lumber industry, whether he knows it or not.”[10] Though it is the exact same forest, the grandfather walked through it as a forest not as standing reserve ready to become newspapers and illustrated magazines. Technology transformed the phenomenon of a forest so that it was experienced according to the “orderability of cellulous” and the possibility of being “challenged forth by the need for paper.”[11] This leads Heidegger to suggest that nothing is free from the technological a priori, everything is ordered about, and technology can become the only way of revealing so that we cannot see in any way apart from technology.[12]
[10] Applying Heidegger’s framework to the contemporary world of AI, we can see how the emergence of generative AI reveals the internet to us in a new way; suddenly the terabytes of content on the internet become standing reserve for generative AI to turn it into new words, images, and content.
[11] Heidegger’s philosophy of technology leaves little room for human agency and plenty of room for pessimism. The phenomenological tradition, in which Heidegger is placed, also includes scholars such as Jacques Ellul and Lewis Mumford. This tradition has as its starting point is within the human being and the inner aspects of the human subject.[13] This cluster of scholars has a substantive view of technology in that, “technology appears as a force in its own right, one that shapes today’s societies and values from the ground up and has no serious rivals.”[14] The phenomenological tradition, however, has faced serious critiques for imposing its conclusion on all forms of technology without attending to the specifics of the things themselves. In other words, the technological a priori makes the phenomenological tradition blind to exceptions or exclusions born out of empirical analysis of actual technologies. In this sense, its comprehensive and somber picture runs roughshod over the nuances of various and concrete technologies. It paints all modern technologies with the same bleak brush.
[12] Heidegger’s philosophy of technology was articulated in reaction to a far more optimistic view of technology known as the anthropological or instrumentalist view of technology. Heidegger was concerned that the enframing powers of technology had so blinded humanity that everything was seen through the lens of instrumentality, challenging forth, and fundamentally neutral technologies.[15] In many ways, Francis Bacon exemplifies this approach to technology. The Baconian doctrine was one of utility and progress—technology could liberate humanity and promote general human welfare.[16] Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620) depicted technological knowledge and machines as capable of recovering paradise after the Edenic Fall and bringing about a New Jerusalem dominion over nature.[17]
[13] Even more extreme in his optimism was the American engineer John Adolphus Etzler (1791-1846). Etzler authored a pamphlet, “the Paradise within the Reach of all Men, without Labour, by the Powers of Nature and Machinery,” that depicted a new Eden that was marked by dominion over nature through technological transformation.[18] Exemplifying Heidegger’s concept of ‘challenging forth,’ Etlzer asked his readers why humanity had not yet taken control of the sun, wind, water, tides, and steam to become the lord of creation.[19] This anthropological approach to technology viewed technology as value-neutral tools or instrument with absolute room for human agency in nearly limitless optimism.[20] This tradition, emerging out of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, viewed technology as a set of value-neutral tools capable of bringing about liberation from toil and misery.[21] Heidegger, Ellul, and Mumford were in many ways responding to and critiquing this anthropological tradition within philosophy of technology.
[14] Similar to the anthropological (or instrumentalist) tradition is what Egbert Schuurman calls the positivist tradition.[22] This tradition includes scholars such as Norbert Wiener,[23] Karl Steinbuch,[24] and Georg Klaus.[25] Positivists hold a strong rationalistic bent and regard modern technology with a high degree of favor. Standing in sharp contrast to the pessimism of the phenomenological and transcendentalist traditions, positivists hold that the progress of technology has contributed to the elimination of human suffering. Fundamentally future oriented, positivists regard technology as ushering in human well-being and prosperity through technocracy.[26] Despite the differences between the anthropological and positivist traditions, they share a family resemblance in their optimistic regard for technology and its capabilities.
Looking Forward
[15] Thus far, it has been explained that within the philosophy of technology there exists a cluster of optimistic traditions and a group that is decidedly pessimistic. These traditions stand in stark contrast with one another. These differing paradigms can succumb to an incommensurability that inhibits any generative interaction or synthesis of insights. Can one retain the benefits of these differing traditions without adopting an incoherent and unrealistic form of pluralism?[27] A path forward comes in the work of Egbert Schuurman and his theologically informed philosophy of technology. Schuurman, a Dutch philosopher of technology scholar, offers an approach to technology that has the capability to both critique the extremes of techno-pessimism (the phenomenological/transcendentalist view) and the extremes of techno-optimism (the anthropological/instrumentalist/positivist traditions) while also retaining their helpful insights.
[16] According to Schuurman, despite the differences in techno-pessimism and techno-optimism, the traditions agree in that they are grounded in the pretension of autonomy.[28] Schuurman argues that both traditions are engaged in a form of self-worship — techno-optimists engage in an outward focused self-worship while the techno-pessimists engage in an inward focused self-worship. Despite the different trajectories of their self-worship, Schuurman argues that, “Both set up their own laws, and neither acknowledge any suprasubjective laws of normative principles.”[29] In other words, both traditions possess a fatal sense of autonomy; techno-pessimists set human freedom and autonomy as an absolute whereas techno-optimists confirms human freedom and autonomy through the successes of technology. Both are wrong-headed; as long as humanity seeks to legislate its own absolute values, it will never develop a proper philosophy of technology.
[17] Schuurman thus proposes a view of technology in which human freedom is not excluded as in techno-optimism nor absolutized as in techno-pessimism. Arguing that these philosophies of technology have to do with absolutes, Schuurman argues that, “The fundamental choice upon which this pretension rests is a radical one and thus is religious in character.”[30] Having opened a door for putting philosophy of technology into conversation with religion, Schuurman presents his proposal for a theologically informed philosophy of technology:
Philosophy can be serviceable in indicating a meaningful perspective for technological development only when it is anchored in religion, a religion in which it is confessed that reality is a creation of God, that God is the Origin of all things, that He binds the creation to His laws, and that the history of created reality, in which the mutual relations and coherence of all things are fixed, is led, controlled, and brought to its consummation by Him. The Christian religion acknowledges that God accepts humanity as a partner in all this in that He makes people in their freedom responsible for the progress of history. Humanity, having fallen into sin, receives salvation in and through faith in Christ. In technology, too, people may work again (although their work may be accompanied by crises or ‘judgments’) at the disclosure of the creation, working toward the building and coming of the Kingdom of God, in which the creation will be fully opened up and redeemed from all the consequences of the fall into sin.[31]
[18] This “philosophy fed by the springs of Christian faith” is liberating in that it has been saved from the delusion of self-sufficiency.[32] This normative perspective for technologic development frees philosophy of technology from the dialectic conflict between power and freedom, techno-optimism and techno-pessimism. The insights of techno-pessimists can be retained in part without having to absolutize human freedom. Similarly, the insights of techno-optimists can be retained in part without having to absolutize technological-scientific thought or technocracy.
[19] Schuurman proposes a philosophy of technology in which the creation and use of technology is comprehended according to both a coram deo (as valued by God) and coram mundo (as valued by the world) perspective.[33] Schuurman speaks of technology as having a “vertical” direction in that it shares an involvement with and dependence upon God.[34] Yet, it also has a “horizontal” direction within the history of creation from beginning to end so that it has a meaningful place and purpose within the world. This theologically informed philosophy of technology argues that the normativity for the direction in which technology should be developed is given in the form of normative principles that are supraarbitrary and suprasubjective, and thus independent of humankind. It is man’s duty to bring technology further along, and to do so in freedom, in believing obedience, that is, in subjection to the normative principles of the law of God for the disclosure of culture.[35]
[20] In articulating his theologically informed philosophy of technology, Schuurman provides room for human actors while not absolutizing human freedom. As one would expect from an approach to technology that understands God as accepting human beings as partners with a responsibility for creation, Schuurman’s philosophy of technology does not eclipse human agency. Schuurman states that he prefers, “to let the emphasis fall upon the place of humankind in technology—particularly on changes in the relationship between people and the technological panoply of tools and instruments … Technology is certainly related to people, but its meaning is not exhausted with them.”[36] Nevertheless, Schuurman retains a strong sense of hamartiology, a theology of sin and fault, and the impact of the fall on humanity. In this regard, humanity is constantly impinged upon by shortcomings and shortsightedness that threaten to inhibit technological development thereby limiting its beneficial potential.[37] This is a key insight that is missing from the techno-optimist traditions.
[21] Along with providing space for human actors, Schuurman’s theologically informed philosophy of technology opens wide the door for ethical discourse as it relates to technological development. Since he has a firm sense of technology conforming to supraarbitrary normative principles, Schuurman’s philosophy of technology is very conversant with topics relating to technology and virtues, morality, and ethics.[38] While the thorns and thistles of a fallen creation will hamper the creation of truly good and beneficial technologies, technological development should occur within the promised fulfillment of the eschaton when God makes all things new. Accordingly, this perspective gives rise to both hope and a sense of obligation so that technology is marked with an, “ethics in which people are expected to invest in their responsibility to seek the meaning of technology—not in isolation, but as woven into the full meaning of reality: the Kingdom of God.”[39]
[22] Schuurman’s theologically informed philosophy of technology seeks “a sustainable balanced set of relations” that rejects a subject-object dichotomy wherein humanity is the center of all technological development.[40] Schuurman instead proposes an understanding of technology that emphasizes a reciprocity of relations that emphasizes human connectedness with the whole of creation, is dependent upon on it, and responsible for being caretaker of the garden that is God’s creation.[41] This theologically informed perspective on technology resists an unabated technical culture that, in the words of Schuurman, “puts things under pressure and even destroys them. Their individuality, their fullness and wholeness, their own character and integrity are delivered up to the abstractions.”[42] A purely humanist approach to technology leaves little room for a love that seeks the well-being of the other while attending to that which is personal, particular, or unique. In contrast, a theologically informed philosophy of technology would affirm, “that reality as it exists from, by, and for God is a reality full of meaning. This brings reverence, respect, admiration, gratitude, appreciation (valuing a thing at its true worth) and caution.”[43]
[23] Schuurman offers a theologically informed philosophy of technology that resists the absolutization of human freedom and power by instead arguing that technology must conform to supraarbitrary normative principles that align with God’s creation mandates. This results in a philosophy of technology ‘fed by the springs of Christian faith’ that provides a proper place for the role of human actors, moral relevance of technology, and attentiveness to the particularities of things as constitutive of a meaningful lifeworld.
[24] And this is exactly the sort of ethical and philosophical framework that should surround our new interactions with AI. As we look into the world that AI mirrors, our views are often occluded and incomplete: “For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I have been fully known” (1 Corinthians 13:12). We must look into AI and the world it brings forth with neither undue optimism or pessimism. We must also look into the mirror of AI, not as those “who have no hope” (1 Thessalonians 4:13). Rather, but with a theologically informed view that is fed by the springs of the Christian faith. Only then can we see this technology for what it truly is and use it as we ought.
[1] Shannon Vallor, The AI Mirror: How to Reclaim Our Humanity in an Age of Machine Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024), 9-10.
[2] A helpful foray into philosophy of technology is available from Mark Coeckelbergh, Introduction to Philosophy of Technology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Coeckelbergh discusses the varying camps and conversations within philosophy of technology while also highlighting the important contributions of various scholars within the field.
[3] Val Dusek and Robert Scharff, Philosophy of Technology: The Technological Condition: An Anthology (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), x.
[4] Frederick Ferré, Philosophy of Technology (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 63.
[5] Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Garland, 1977), 3.
[6] Heidegger, Question Concerning Technology, 6.
[7] Nolen Gertz, Nihilism and Technology (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 37.
[8] Gertz, Nihilism and Technology, 37-38.
[9] Ferré, Philosophy of Technology, 66.
[10] Heidegger, Question Concerning Technology, 18.
[11] Heidegger, Question Concerning Technology, 18.
[12] Ferré, Philosophy of Technology, 68.
[13] Egbert Schuurman, Technology and the Future: A Philosophical Challenge (Toronto: Wedge, 1980), 51.
[14] Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A Philosophical Inquiry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 9.
[15] Gertz, Nihilism and Technology, 39.
[16] Peter Harrison, The Territories of Science and Religion (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015), 169.
[17] Thomas Hughes, Human-Built World: How to Think About Technology and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 26.
[18] Hughes, Human-Built World, 35.
[19] Hughes, Human-Built World, 35.
[20] This view is exemplified by Elon Musk. I explore this topic in ‘Can We Build Our Own Future?’ The Christian Century, August 2024, 44-ff.
[21] Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, 35.
[22] Schuurman, Technology and the Future, 52.
[23] Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics; Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine, 8th ed. (New York: Wiley & Sons, 1950).
[24] Karl Steinbuch, Automat und Mensch: Über Menschliche und Maschinelle Intelligenz. (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1965).
[25] Georg Klaus, Kybernetik und Erkenntnistheorie. (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1969).
[26] Schuurman, Technology and the Future, 324.
[27] Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, 11.
[28] Schuurman, Technology and the Future, 326.
[29] Schuurman, Technology and the Future, 326.
[30] Schuurman, Technology and the Future, 327.
[31] Schuurman, Technology and the Future, 327.
[32] Schuurman, Technology and the Future, 328.
[33] Egbert Schuurman, “A Christian Philosophical Perspective on Technology” in Theology and Technology: Essays in Christian Analysis and Exegesis, ed. Carl Mitcham and Jim Grote (Lanham: University Press of America, 1984), 118.
[34] Schuurman, Technology and the Future, 329.
[35] Schuurman, Technology and the Future, 328.
[36] Schuurman, Technology and the Future, 329.
[37] Schuurman, Technology and the Future, 362.
[38] Egbert Schuurman, Faith and Hope in Technology (Toronto: Clements, 2003), 179.
[39] Egbert Schuurman, The Technological World Picture and an Ethics of Responsibility: Struggles in the Ethics of Technology (Sioux City, IA: Dordt College Press, 2005), 63.
[40] Schuurman, Faith and Hope in Technology, 170.
[41] Schuurman, Faith and Hope in Technology, 166.
[42] Schuurman, Faith and Hope in Technology, 101.
[43] Schuurman, Faith and Hope in Technology, 171.